

REMARKS

Claims 28-41 have been amended. Claims 1-41 remain pending in the application. Reconsideration is respectfully requested in light of the following remarks.

Section 101 Rejection:

The Office Action rejected claims 28-41 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in regard to the phrase “carrier medium”. Applicants note that “carrier medium” as described in Applicants’ specification and as used in claim 28-41 clearly refers to a medium that includes computer-executable instructions and, as such, recites statutory subject matter. To clarify, Applicants have amended claims 28-41 to use the more common equivalent terminology of “computer accessible medium”. Withdrawal of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection is respectfully requested.

Section 102(e) Rejection:

The Office Action rejected claims 1-41 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Bruck et al. (U.S. Patent 6,268,856) (hereinafter “Bruck”). Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection for at least the following reasons.

Contrary to the Examiner’s assertion, Bruck does not teach accessing a first space, wherein the first space comprises a first network-addressable storage location, wherein information usable to access the first space is provided in an advertisement for the first space, wherein the advertisement for the first space comprises a first schema, and wherein the first schema specifies one or more messages usable to invoke functions of the first space. In contrast, Bruck teaches displaying intermediate content through a browser as the browser transitions from a first content site to a second content site (col. 7, lines 51-62). Bruck clearly does not teach that information usable to access the first space is provided in an advertisement for the first space, wherein the advertisement for the first space comprises a first schema, and wherein the first schema specifies one or more

messages usable to invoke functions of the first space. The Examiner refers to the site at the address indicated at 104 as the first space and to the secondary display regions 109 within frame region 108 as an advertisement for the first space. However, Bruck describes “a frame region 108 with secondary display regions 109 for presenting additional information to the user, such as local time and weather, news, the identifier of the displayed content, advertisements, links to other content, etc.” (col. 7, lines 39-43). Bruck’s secondary display regions 109 are clearly not advertisements for the site at address 104. In fact, Bruck teaches that “region 108 [which includes secondary display regions 109] typically originates from a publisher other than the publisher of the displayed content, and because region 108 may have been previously stored or generated, it may remain even though the previously viewed primary content is no longer displayed.” (col. 8, lines 17-21). Thus, Bruck teaches that secondary display regions 109 are not associated with the site at 104.

Furthermore, the advertisements referred to in Bruck are commercial advertisements, not advertisements for a space that provide information usable to access the space and comprise a schema that specifies one or more messages usable to invoke functions of the space. The commercial advertisements of Bruck have nothing to do with an advertisement for a space that provides information usable to access the space and comprises a schema that specifies one or more messages usable to invoke functions of the space. The Examiner refers to element 102 in Bruck’s Fig. 6 as a schema that specifies one or more messages usable to invoke functions of the first space. However, Bruck teaches element 102 in Fig. 6 is “a primary display 102, which typically includes first content in the form of data or other information requested by the user, and includes the displayed text, audio, video, etc., as well as associated formatting, layout, etc.” (col. 7, lines 22-25). Thus, Bruck’s primary display 102 is simply the browser’s display of the content accessed from the address indicated at 104. Bruck’s primary display 102 is clearly not a schema that specifies one or more messages usable to invoke functions of the first space.

The Examiner refers to elements 102, 106, 104 and 109 in Bruck's Fig. 6 and col. 7, lines 29-33 as teaching one or more messages specified by the schema usable to invoke functions of the first space. However, as explained above, Bruck's primary display 102 is simply the browser's display of the content accessed from the address indicated at 104. Bruck teaches that the content shown in display 102 may include "links 106" to other content providers. (col. 7, lines 29-33). As discussed above, elements 109 in Bruck are secondary display regions 109 that are not even associate with the content display in 102. None of the portions of Bruck cited by the Examiner have anything to do with a schema that specifies one or more messages usable to invoke functions of the first space.

Moreover, contrary to the Examiner's assertions, Bruck does not teach requesting creation of a second space by sending to the first space one of the messages specified by the first schema. The Examiner refers to lightweight transition 110 in Bruck as a second space. The Examiner also states that link 106 in Bruck is a message specified by the schema from the first space's advertisement that is sent to the first space to create the second space. However, Bruck describes lightweight transition 110 as a intermediate display including a status display 112 to indicate that the browser is transitioning from the first content provider to a second content provider. (col. 7, line 63 – col. 8, line 11). This teaching in Bruck has absolutely no relevance to requesting creation of a second space by sending to the first space one of the messages specified by the first schema. Link 106 in Bruck is simply a link to another content provider. Link 106 in Bruck is clearly not a message that is sent to the first space to request creation of a second space. Nor does Bruck teach that link is a message specified by a schema from an advertisement for the first space.

Furthermore, contrary to the Examiner's assertions, Bruck does not teach creating the second space in response to the requesting creation of the second space, wherein the second space comprises a second network-addressable storage location, wherein information usable to access the second space is provided in an advertisement for the second space, wherein the advertisement for the second space comprises a second schema, and wherein the second schema specifies one or more messages usable to invoke

functions of the second space. As explained above, lightweight transition 110 in Bruck is clearly not a second space created in response to sending a message to the first space. Moreover, element 116 in Bruck is a form of a heavyweight transition that may be displayed instead of lightweight transition 110. (col. 8, lines 30-41). Contrary to the Examiner's assertion, heavyweight transition 116 is clearly not advertisement for the second space that provides information usable to access the second space and a second schema that specifies one or more messages usable to invoke functions of the second space. Similarly, element 120 in Bruck is simply the display of the second content after the intermediate transitional content has been displayed. (col. 8, lines 41-43). The second content display 120 has nothing to do with an advertisement for a space as discussed above. Applicants also note that elements 118 and 122 are described in Bruck as content that is display, not schemas that specify one or more messages usable to invoke functions of the second space. Additionally, 124 is a link to another site and 109 is separate secondary display regions. Elements 124 and 109 of Bruck are certainly not messages usable to invoke functions of a space.

Furthermore, contrary to the Examiner's assertions, Bruck does not teach accessing the second space by sending to the second space one of the messages specified by the second schema. The Examiner refers to col. 8, lines 29-35 of Bruck. However, this portion of Bruck describes a heavyweight transition 116 in which intermediate content 118 is displayed to the user even though the intermediate content was not requested by the user. Applicants fail to see how this has any relevance whatsoever to accessing the second space by sending to the second space one of the messages specified by the second schema.

Applicants remind the Examiner that anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art reference disclosure of each and every element of the claimed invention, arranged as in the claim. M.P.E.P 2131; *Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.*, 221 USPQ 481, 485 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the claims. *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). For the reasons discussed above, the

Examiner's section 102(e) is not supported by the cited art and withdrawal thereof is respectfully requested.

Similar arguments apply to the other independent claims. Applicants also assert that numerous ones of the dependent claims recite further distinctions over the cited art. However, since the independent claims have been shown to be patentably distinct, a further discussion of the dependent claims is not necessary at this time.

CONCLUSION


Applicants submit the application is in condition for allowance, and notice to that effect is respectfully requested.

If any extension of time (under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136) is necessary to prevent the above referenced application from becoming abandoned, Applicants hereby petition for such extension. If any fees are due, the Commissioner is authorized to charge said fees to Meyertons, Hood, Kivlin, Kowert, & Goetzel, P.C. Deposit Account No. 501505/5181-64700/RCK.

Also enclosed herewith are the following items:

- Return Receipt Postcard
- Petition for Extension of Time
- Notice of Change of Address
- Fee Authorization Form authorizing a deposit account debit in the amount of \$ for fees ().
- Other:

Respectfully submitted,



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